Comment A rifle-wielding Uvalde police officer had Robb Elementary gunman in front of him before entering the school building, but worried about hitting kids and asked for permission to shoot — and didn’t get it, according to an after-action report released Tuesday. Officer’s supervisor ‘either didn’t hear the request or responded too slowly’ to stop 18-year-old shooter – one of many missed opportunities to stop the massacre that ended the lives of 19 children and two teachers. Researchers from the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center (ALERRT) at Texas State University, which specializes in active shooter training, also found tactical errors and potential protocol violations in a review of the police response to the worst school shooting in the United States. in almost a decade. Subject matter experts based their findings on an hour-long briefing with an investigator and evidence such as surveillance footage, oral testimony and radio logs. The Texas Department of Public Safety and Gov. Greg Abbott (R) asked ALERRT to review the police response. It’s one of several reports and investigations being conducted by local, state and federal officials looking into the much-criticized law enforcement response. in the slaughter. It took one hour, 11 minutes and 26 seconds after the first officers arrived on the scene for law enforcement to enter the classroom and kill the gunman. In the intervening minutes, injured and dying children in rooms 111 and 112 were trapped and called 911 begging for help. A three-member Texas House quasi-judicial committee spent weeks interviewing 36 people — 19 of whom are law enforcement officers — behind closed doors and is expected to produce an investigative report by the end of July. The commission said witnesses have been cooperative, but Uvalde County Sheriff Ruben Nolasco has so far ignored requests to testify and could face a subpoena. The Justice Department is also reviewing law enforcement’s response to the attack. While the ALERRT report echoes much of what Texas Department of Public Safety officials outlined for state senators earlier this month, education experts added context and perspective to understand what should or could have happened if law enforcement had executed their training. Their timeline, however, does not explain why certain decisions were made. Armed Uvalde officers waited for key to unlock door, official says “Ultimately it is unclear why the officers decided to attack the room at 12:50:03,” the report said. “While we do not have definitive information at this point, it is possible that some of the people who died during this event could have been saved if they had received quicker medical attention.” Much of the blame and anger has been directed at Uvalde School Police Chief Pedro “Pete” Arredondo, who recently resigned from his position on the city council. However, the authors focused on the individual actions of the officers responding to the scene and the chaos that overshadowed the multiple missed opportunities police had to stop the shooter. An attorney for Arredondo did not respond to requests for comment. In the Uvalde officer’s case, waiting for permission to use deadly force cost valuable time, the report said. The officer standing 148 yards away would have been justified in shooting but was concerned about missing and injuring students. The hesitation doomed the possibility of stopping the slaughter before it began. “When he turned back to address the suspect, the suspect had already entered the west hall exterior door at 11:33:00 a.m.,” the authors wrote. Pete Blair, executive director of ALERRT and one of the report’s authors, said that under Texas law, it is not necessary for an officer to seek permission to use deadly force. While individual departments may have policies for specific circumstances, he said the officer ultimately had the authority to make a call on his own. “He didn’t need permission,” Blair said. A Uvalde school district officer who arrived at the school within minutes drove so fast that he missed the gunman. Experts said that if he had approached more slowly, he “may have seen the suspect and been able to restrain him before the suspect entered the building.” The first three Uvalde police officers on the scene retreated when shots were fired inside the school, killing the momentum, the report said. Two officers were grazed as the gunman’s bullets pierced the Sheetrock walls. But what followed was a series of muddled decisions that didn’t seem to adhere to protocol for active-shooter situations. Cops are trained to “stop the killing” and then “stop the dying,” but law enforcement in Uvalde was fixated on keys and locks for doors they hadn’t tried to open. The shooting continued while police failed to develop an alternative plan to attack the gunman. Half a century after one movement, the ‘Fierce Madres’ in Uvalde are calling for another The officers had body armor and rifles, but did not return fire. Arredondo called for a SWAT team. They asked for ballistic shields. The chief attempted to negotiate with the shooter who was unresponsive. However, none of these requests seemed to prompt immediate action to save lives, the report said. “The first priority is to preserve the lives of victims/potential victims. Second is officer safety and last is the suspect,” the experts said. “This order means we expect officers to take the risk to save innocent lives.” “It is not surprising that officers who had never been shot at before would be overwhelmed by the directed fire,” the report said. Every law enforcement officer, the report notes, should be aware of the possibility of being injured or killed. Arredondo testified for hours before a Texas House committee in a closed-door hearing, but has rarely spoken publicly since the shooting. His attorney, George E. Hyde, previously told the Texas Tribune that he was committed as a first responder and “didn’t have the capacity to be able to run the entire agency” in response to the shooting. “The lack of effective management likely undercut both the Stop the Killing and Stop the Dying parts of the response,” the report said. The report also confirmed that a Uvalde school teacher had closed the exterior door behind her when she retreated into the building. But it was unlocked. The shooter had no problem getting in. If it was locked, however, the gunman could have shot through the windows and gained access to the door anyway. It’s the first time ALERRT has been asked to produce a formal after-action report, Blair said. DPS officials provided the briefing and access to the evidence. The report is the first installment of an expected three-part study, Blair said. “A lot of what they did was inconsistent with our optimal response, but you have to give people the benefit of the doubt,” Blair said. “The point of this is not to say these guys messed up or are responsible, but to identify what went right and what went wrong.” Texas state Sen. Roland Gutierrez (D) said the report presents nothing new that the police response was flawed and stands in stark contrast to what law enforcement has done in other recent mass shootings. The senator noted that the report did not detail the role Texas state troopers played. “DPS facilitated this report,” Gutierrez said. “Are we really supposed to believe that the guy who broke up fights in the cafeteria was running the show that day?”
