The redefinition of NATO has four elements. The first is strategic – recognizing that efforts to build a cooperative relationship with Russia have ended in the foreseeable future and that Russia’s unwarranted invasion of Ukraine also signals a wider confrontation with the West. The second is the reversal of the post-1989 era of defense budget cuts. This has now been replaced by an expanded deterrent characterized by aid to Ukraine, higher military spending over the next decade and a sevenfold increase in the number of NATO troops on alert to reach 300,000. The third element is a partial reversal of European developments by the US. The American axis in the Pacific, facing the rise of China, has not been abandoned, but President Biden is now allowing a greater escalation of the US military presence in Europe since the Cold War. It is important that most of this American escalation will be in the east of our continent, with a new headquarters in Poland, 5,000 additional troops in Romania and more intense developments in the Baltic states. Finally, NATO expanded its membership, formally calling on Sweden and Finland – the latter with an 800-mile land border with Russia – to join the alliance. This marks the end of more than 70 years of neutrality by the two Nordic nations. It is a sign of how decisively the invasion of Ukraine has destroyed the broader confidence in Russia. But it has huge military implications for the Baltic. It was achieved only after Turkey, a more than usual critical member of NATO during the current conflict, lifted its previous veto, perhaps amid promises that the US would soon supply it with reinforced F-16 fighter jets. These are big changes. Russian aggression has pushed the West to a major political milestone. However, in a way this is also a return to a once familiar security landscape. It finds NATO, in essence, launching a new Cold War mission. It may mark the birth of a new era of collective Western deterrence of Russian rule. The implications for domestic and international politics must not be underestimated. But the world – and Europe – of the 2020s is very different from that of the late 1940s. It is unknown at this time what he will do after leaving the post. Much depends on what happens on the battlefield in the coming months. All democracies will face major dilemmas over spending priorities and military commitments. A change of government in Washington could radically transform the outlook, leaving Europe struggling to maintain adequate support and entice Russia to simply end the confrontation. It is important not to overdo it, especially early. However, this is a permanent problem for Britain. Words and commitments are not the same as plans, results, developments, training and spending. Many of what was agreed in Madrid will take years to come into force, if at all. Boris Johnson and some of the ministers who are maneuvering to replace him are exhibitors whose puffy tongues are aimed exclusively at the Tories party. Threats against China, such as Liz Truss this week, are an example. Defending Ukraine and deterring Russia is more than enough to keep us going.
