Apart from confirming the well-established fact that Putin is a malevolent and disloyal actor, there is not much new to be gleaned from the transcript of a telephone conversation between Macron and Putin, which took place four days before the invasion. The text has been released as part of an Elysee-sanctioned television documentary in the hope of highlighting Macron’s credentials as a global dealmaker. However, this is not the impression one has of the “Jupiter” president of France. Putin, chastising Macron, rages over Ukraine’s 2014 “coup” in which “people were burned alive”. Instead of challenging the nonsense, Macron assures Putin that he “does [his] better pressure’ the Ukrainians and is trying to entice him to stay at the negotiating table with the prospect of a one-on-one meeting with President Biden in Geneva. A transcript of a conversation between Macron and Putin four days before the invasion has been released. AFP via Getty Images The rest, as they say, is history. The puzzle, however, was Macron’s willingness to talk to Putin and be humiliated by him again and again, even after this proved fruitless experience. In fact, Macron recently mentioned a “hundred hours” of conversation he had with Putin since December. For what purpose? The most charitable way to understand Macron’s strategy is through the figure of his mentor, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, from whom he borrowed his penchant for synthesizing seemingly incompatible positions and courses of action. Macron’s own political movement, LREM, and his candidacy was a way to move beyond the political left and right. In 2017 and again this year, he defeated populist candidates in presidential elections while being a populist disruptor himself. He wants a state that protects workers while at the same time pushing, albeit with mixed results, to liberalize France’s ossified labor markets. Putin spent most of the conversation ranting about the 2014 “coup” in Ukraine. SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images Ukraine’s war will likely require a political settlement. AP The philosophy of “at the same time” — “en même temps” — places France in the position of a supposedly impartial and reliable mediator in the current war and a major supplier of military equipment to Ukraine. Just as Macron spoke of the dangers of “humiliating Russia” in order to “build an exit ramp through diplomatic means”, Caesar’s howitzers under France’s condition made a real difference to the defense efforts in Donbass. However, a politician should not allow any theory, however refined or elegant, to blind him to reality. To anyone not fond of continental philosophy, it was obvious that Macron’s initial attempt to reach out to Putin via the Versailles summit in 2017 was a dead end. Instead of learning from an early mistake, the French leader insisted that everything that was happening in the deterioration of the West’s relations with Russia was a nail, ready for his Ricoeurian hammer. Eastern Europe is not a Sorbonne seminar room. There is no smart way to “get over” a confrontation with a bully trapped in his ideology-driven worldview, who seeks to restore Mother Russia, long humiliated by the West, to her rightful place by trampling on freedom and her self-determination. neighbours. The only language bullies understand is that of hard, uncompromising power. Yes, Russia’s war against Ukraine will come to an end, eventually, and it will likely involve a political settlement, and maybe even a handshake, with Putin. What Macron’s philosophy fails to grasp is that the time for such an arrangement will come only after the basic contours of that arrangement have been decided on the battlefield. Today, a single consideration should guide the actions of France, as well as those of other Western allies: The better Ukraine does in the current war, the stronger it (and the collective West) will be at the negotiating table. Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC. Twitter: @DaliborRohac.
