But these star witnesses sometimes overshadow other testimonies, especially those of a more technical nature. After all, one of the main aims of the investigation is to shed light on what caused the two derailments of Alstom Citadis Spirit trains in 2021. We now know that the second, in September of that year, was due to human error and — in the words of a Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) report — “deficient maintenance.” Indeed, the performance of the maintenance arm of Rideau Transit Group (RTG) and its subcontractor Alstom is one of the key issues of this research. But what caused the August 2021 derailment? The wheel broke the axle due to a bearing problem, but we still don’t know what loosened the bolt inside the bearing in the first place. The final week of hearings for the Ottawa streetcar public inquiry begins Monday. (Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press) Alstom has a theory. The France-based company, together with axle manufacturer Texelis, put together a preliminary report in early May. His central claim is that stress on the components came from excessive stress from driving around sharp curves on the Confederation Line. And not only is there the stress of the train components, but there’s also “grooving” in the rail: tiny wave-like ridges that had to be sanded away. (How often and how well this grinding is done — or should be done — is a matter of research debate.) The report claims that “the actual track that has been built does not conform to the design as stated” in the specifications agreed by Alstom with the LRT builders. The axle of an LRT train on Ottawa’s Confederation Line detached from the rail on August 8, 2021, prompting an investigation by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. (Alexander Behne/CBC) The rail was flatter than expected, according to the train manufacturer. The inquest heard from officials at both Alstom and OLRT Constructors – that is the construction arm of the Rideau Transit Group – that the gauge, or distance between parallel rails, was too narrow. During the testing phase, OLRT Constructors widened the tracks. Lowell Goudge, Alstom’s chief engineer and safety certifier for the Citadis Spirit trains, testified on June 21 that while the company was able to operate the vehicles safely, it still had “concerns.” The track profile also doesn’t match the wheel profile, the report claims. “It’s a combination of the track, the rail interface, the operating profile,” he said. Goudge, who signed off on Alstom’s preliminary investigation, admitted the company cannot make clear cause-and-effect findings from all its observations. “The only conclusion we could really come to was that we were getting excessive loads in the curves,” he testified. And this unexpected pressure was causing premature component wear, which led to the August 2021 derailment.
The limited testing window for the LRT may have caused problems for officials, the survey found
Lowell Goudge, who was a train system engineer for the Confederation Line, says the test schedule seemed “compressed,” which may have caused officials to miss problems that would have been seen if the tests had gone on longer. However, Rideau Transit Group does not agree with Alstom’s preliminary conclusions. “RTG has commissioned an independent root cause analysis that will consider Alstom’s findings and evidence, as well as information provided by all other relevant parties,” according to a statement from Helen Bobat, a spokeswoman for RTG and its parent company. SNC-Lavalin. ACS Infrastructure and Ellis Don.
Urban railway manager worried about track, derailments
The track itself has been the subject of debate in local rail circles for years. A CBC access to information request for communications about the cracked wheel issue in the summer of 2020 revealed that one of the city’s rail managers had raised concerns about a possible derailment a full year before the two in 2021. On July 13, 2020, Russ Hoas — a rail systems administrator, particularly for the Trillium Line — wrote to director of rail operations Duane Duquette about his concerns about wheel cracks. Hoas “strongly suggested” that the fleet be withdrawn until the problem was dealt with. (The TSB said in December 2020 that a protruding jack screw may have caused the cracks, but the final report has yet to be released.) “The bad track just adds a higher degree of potential derailment while in revenue service,” Hoas wrote. He continued: “Poor design combined with the lack of proper geometry testing in 2017 and 2019 (prior service), as pointed out at the time, would have provided evidence of anomalies in the orbit structure. Not forgetting that the wheel/rail interface is the key component in causing derailment Trains screeching around curves [the Confederation Line] it is an indication of an inappropriate running surface in a lack of balance speed inside the curves.” OC Transpo Director of Transit Operations, Troy Charter. (Jean Delisle/CBC) Hoas was one of five city-appointed appraisers, along with railroad director Michael Morgan, who failed SNC-Lavalin in their technical submission for the Trillium line extension. SNC-Lavalin won the $1.67 billion contract. According to his LinkedIn profile, Hoas worked for Bombardier for 15 years before joining the city in 2015. Troy Charter, the city’s director of transit services and rail operations, wrote to Duquette that he wanted to meet with Hoas to build on his knowledge but also to “make clear that at no time was public safety compromised.” . He also wrote that he was “disappointed” that Hoas believed the city would “ever consider operating a service while putting customers at risk.” The city did not allow CBC to interview Hoas. Also, the first response sent after the CBC’s access to information request did not include the email from Hoas or the response from Charter. Both were implemented only after the CBC requested a second search for records.
The LRT builders’ counsel had concerns
And testimony Friday morning from Councilman Derek Wynne — overshadowed by the mayor’s mock appearance at the inquiry that afternoon — conveyed even more concerns about the track. Wynne is a senior vice president at UK-based SEMP, which was the systems engineering and assurance firm hired by OLRT Consultants from 2017 until shortly after the launch of the LRT in fall 2019. He testified that even by 2018, it was clear that security analysis was seen as something that should be checked at the end, rather than something that should have been implemented from the start. The committee saw a few pages of a PowerPoint presentation called “OLRT-C Rail Wear Hazard” from January 2019 that Wynne said was never presented because the track evaluation “caused a lot of concern.” The presentation concluded that based on the design of the wheel interface, there was a “significant potential to develop rail defect hazards” that could lead to “premature failure of the rail component”. Wynne said that at the request of OLRT Constructor executives, he came up with a “softer worded report” that called for more restrictions and maintenance on the system, as opposed to “significant changes” to the track. “Both options are valid – either fix it before revenue service or maintain it extensively during service,” he said, adding that the issues were “well known” before the LRT was in public service. The UK consultant, who testified that he had no connection to Alstom, appeared to agree with some of the train company’s assessment of what may have led to the bearing failure that caused the August 2019 derailment. The safety certificate he eventually signed near the end of the project included warnings about how to maintain the track, but it wasn’t clear to Wynne when he returned to Ottawa — two years after the LRT opened — whether all the restrictions he had put in place were being followed. City manager Steve Kanellakos is scheduled to testify on Monday, followed by independent certifier Monica Sechiari of the Altus Group.
